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＜電子ブック＞
Types, Tableaus, and Gödel’s God / by M. Fitting
(Trends in Logic, Studia Logica Library. ISSN:22127313 ; 12)

版	1st ed. 2002.
出版者	(Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer)
出版年	2002
本文言語	英語
大きさ	XV, 181 p : online resource
著者標目	*Fitting, M author SpringerLink (Online service)
件　名	LCSH:Logic LCSH:Ontology LCSH:Religion -- Philosophy  全ての件名で検索 LCSH:Metaphysics FREE:Logic FREE:Ontology FREE:Philosophy of Religion FREE:Metaphysics
一般注記	I Classical Logic -- Classical Logic-Syntax -- Classical Logic-Semantics -- Classical Logic-Basic Tableaus -- Soundness And Completeness -- Equality -- Extensionality -- II Modal Logic -- Modal Logic, Syntax And Semantics -- Modal Tableaus -- Miscellaneous Matters -- III Ontological Arguments -- Godel’s Argument, Background -- Godel’s Argument, Formally -- References Gödel's modal ontological argument is the centrepiece of an extensive examination of intensional logic. First, classical type theory is presented semantically, tableau rules for it are introduced, and the Prawitz/Takahashi completeness proof is given. Then modal machinery is added, semantically and through tableau rules, to produce a modified version of Montague/Gallin intensional logic. Extensionality, rigidity, equality, identity, and definite descriptions are investigated. Finally, various ontological proofs for the existence of God are discussed informally, and the Gödel argument is fully formalized. Objections to the Gödel argument are examined, including one due to Howard Sobel showing Gödel's assumptions are so strong that the modal logic collapses. It is shown that this argument depends critically on whether properties are understood intensionally or extensionally. Parts of the book are mathematical, parts philosophical. A reader interested in (modal) type theory can safelyskip ontological issues, just as one interested in Gödel's argument can omit the more mathematical portions, such as the completeness proof for tableaus. There should be something for everybody (and perhaps everything for somebody) HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0411-4

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