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＜電子ブック＞
Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications / edited by Jerzy A. Filar, Vladimir Gaitsgory, Koichi Mizukami
(Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. ISSN:24740187 ; 5)

版	1st ed. 2000.
出版者	(Boston, MA : Birkhäuser Boston : Imprint: Birkhäuser)
出版年	2000
本文言語	英語
大きさ	XVII, 461 p : online resource
著者標目	Filar, Jerzy A editor Gaitsgory, Vladimir editor Mizukami, Koichi editor SpringerLink (Online service)
件　名	LCSH:Game theory LCSH:Mathematics FREE:Game Theory FREE:Applications of Mathematics
一般注記	I Robust Control Design and H? -- Worst-Case Rate-Based Flow Control with an ARMA Model of the Available Bandwidth -- H? Output Feedback Control Problems for Bilinear Systems -- H? Control of a Class of Infinite-Dimensional Linear Systems with Nonlinear Outputs -- Nonstandard Extension of H?-Optimal Control for Singularly Perturbed Systems -- II Pursuit-Evasion (P-E) Games -- Geodesic Parallel Pursuit Strategy in a Simple Motion Pursuit Game on the Sphere -- Real-Time Collision Avoidance: Differential Game, Numerical Solution, and Synthesis of Strategies -- Rendezvous-Evasion as a Multistage Game with Observed Actions -- Identification and Construction of Singular Surfaces in Pursuit-Evasion Games -- On the Numerical Solution of a Class of Pursuit-Evasion Games -- III Coupled Dynamic and Stochastic Games -- Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games with Coupled State Constraints -- Constrained Markov Games: Nash Equilibria -- Piecewise-Deterministic Differential Games and Dynamic Teams with Hybrid Controls -- A Game Variant of the Stopping Problem on Jump Processes with a Monotone Rule -- IV General Game Theoretic Developments -- Refinement of the Nash Solution for Games with Perfect Information -- A Perturbation on Two-Person Zero-Sum Games -- The Linear Complementarity Problem in Static and Dynamic Games -- Weighted Discounted Stochastic Games with Perfect Information -- Stochastic Games with Complete Information and Average Cost Criteria -- V Applications -- Crime and Law Enforcement: A Multistage Game -- Global Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Game with Bounded Rationality -- A Multistage Supergame of Downstream Pollution -- Solution and Stability for a Simple Dynamic Bottleneck Model -- Cumulants and Risk-Sensitive Control: A Cost Mean and Variance Theory with Application to Seismic Protection ofStructures HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1336-9

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