---

＜電子ブック＞
The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games / by Geir B. Asheim
(Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization. ISSN:21943044 ; 37)

版	1st ed. 2006.
出版者	(New York, NY : Springer US : Imprint: Springer)
出版年	2006
本文言語	英語
大きさ	XIX, 203 p : online resource
著者標目	*Asheim, Geir B author SpringerLink (Online service)
件　名	LCSH:Game theory LCSH:Econometrics LCSH:Mathematical models LCSH:Operations research FREE:Game Theory FREE:Quantitative Economics FREE:Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics FREE:Operations Research and Decision Theory
一般注記	Motivating Examples -- Decision-Theoretic Framework -- Belief Operators -- Basic Characterizations -- Relaxing Completeness -- Backward Induction -- Sequentiality -- Quasi-Perfectness -- Properness -- Capturing forward Induction through Full Permissibility -- Applying Full Permissibility to Extensive Games During the last decade I have explored the consequences of what I have chosen to call the 'consistent preferences' approach to deductive reasoning in games. To a great extent this work has been done in coop­ eration with my co-authors Martin Dufwenberg, Andres Perea, and Ylva Sovik, and it has lead to a series of journal articles. This book presents the results of this research program. Since the present format permits a more extensive motivation for and presentation of the analysis, it is my hope that the content will be of interest to a wider audience than the corresponding journal articles can reach. In addition to active researcher in the field, it is intended for graduate students and others that wish to study epistemic conditions for equilibrium and rationalizability concepts in game theory. Structure of the book This book consists of twelve chapters. The main interactions between the chapters are illustrated in Table 0.1. As Table 0.1 indicates, the chapters can be organized into four dif­ ferent parts. Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the subsequent analysis by introducing the 'consistent preferences' approach, and by presenting ex­ amples and concepts that are revisited throughout the book. Chapters 3 and 4 present the decision-theoretic framework and the belief operators that are used in later chapters. Chapters 5, 6, 10, and 11 analyze games in the strategic form, while the remaining chapters-Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 12-are concerned with games in the extensive form HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-26237-6

 類似資料