---

＜電子ブック＞
Statistics in Science : The Foundations of Statistical Methods in Biology, Physics and Economics / edited by R. Cooke, D. Costantini
(Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. ISSN:22147942 ; 122)

版	1st ed. 1990.
出版者	(Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer)
出版年	1990
本文言語	英語
大きさ	200 p : online resource
著者標目	Cooke, R editor Costantini, D editor SpringerLink (Online service)
件　名	LCSH:Statistics  LCSH:Science -- Philosophy  全ての件名で検索 LCSH:History LCSH:Biology -- Philosophy  全ての件名で検索 FREE:Statistics FREE:Philosophy of Science FREE:History FREE:Philosophy of Biology
一般注記	Method, Theory, and Statistics: The Lesson of Physics -- The Theory of Natural Selection as a Null Theory -- Causality and Exogeneity in econometric models -- Statistics in Expert Resolution: A Theory of Weights for Combining Expert Opinion -- Short and Long Term Survival Analysis in Oncological Research -- A Statistical Approach to the Study of Pollen Fitness -- Statistics in Genetics: Human Migrations Detected by Multivariate Techniques -- Quantum Probability and the Foundations of Quantum Theory -- Indistinguishability, Interchangeability and Indeterminism -- The Non Frequency Approach to Elementary Particle Statistics -- Name Index An inference may be defined as a passage of thought according to some method. In the theory of knowledge it is customary to distinguish deductive and non-deductive inferences. Deductive inferences are truth preserving, that is, the truth of the premises is preserved in the con­ clusion. As a result, the conclusion of a deductive inference is already 'contained' in the premises, although we may not know this fact until the inference is performed. Standard examples of deductive inferences are taken from logic and mathematics. Non-deductive inferences need not preserve truth, that is, 'thought may pass' from true premises to false conclusions. Such inferences can be expansive, or, ampliative in the sense that the performances of such inferences actually increases our putative knowledge. Standard non-deductive inferences do not really exist, but one may think of elementary inductive inferences in which conclusions regarding the future are drawn from knowledge of the past. Since the body of scientific knowledge is increasing, it is obvious that the method of science must allow non-deductive as well as deductive inferences. Indeed, the explosive growth of science in recent times points to a prominent role for the former. Philosophers of science have long tried to isolate and study the non-deductive inferences in science. The inevitability of such inferences one the one hand, juxtaposed with the poverty of all efforts to identify them, constitutes one of the major cognitive embarrassments of our time HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0619-8

 類似資料