---

＜電子ブック＞
Practical Bilevel Optimization : Algorithms and Applications / by Jonathan F. Bard
(Nonconvex Optimization and Its Applications ; 30)

版	1st ed. 1998.
出版者	(New York, NY : Springer US : Imprint: Springer)
出版年	1998
本文言語	英語
大きさ	XII, 476 p : online resource
著者標目	*Bard, Jonathan F author SpringerLink (Online service)
件　名	LCSH:Operations research LCSH:Management science LCSH:Computer science LCSH:Mathematical models FREE:Operations Research, Management Science FREE:Operations Research and Decision Theory FREE:Theory of Computation FREE:Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics
一般注記	1 Introduction -- 2 Linear Programming -- 3 Integer Programming -- 4 Nonlinear Programming -- 5 Linear BLP: Continuous Variables -- 6 Linear BLP: Discrete Variables -- 7 Convex Bilevel Programming -- 8 General Bilevel Programming -- 9 Heuristics -- 10 Transportation Network Design -- 11 Production Planning -- 12 Determining Price Support Levels for Biofuel Crops -- References The use of optimization techniques has become integral to the design and analysis of most industrial and socio-economic systems. Great strides have been made recently in the solution of large-scale problems arising in such areas as production planning, airline scheduling, government regulation, and engineering design, to name a few. Analysts have found, however, that standard mathematical programming models are often inadequate in these situations because more than a single objective function and a single decision maker are involved. Multiple objective programming deals with the extension of optimization techniques to account for several objective functions, while game theory deals with the inter-personal dynamics surrounding conflict. Bilevel programming, the focus of this book, is in a narrow sense the combination of the two. It addresses the problern in which two decision makers, each with their individual objectives, act and react in a noncooperative, sequential manner. The actions of one affect the choices and payoffs available to the other but neither player can completely dominate the other in the traditional sense HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2836-1

 類似資料